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Abstract 
 
Given the contemporary growth of ‘populist’ political parties and movements in a 
number of highly-developed democratic states in Europe and North America, there 
has been a resurgence in academic interest around the various causes for the 
groundswell of support for political populism. Given this broader political context, this 
paper explores the interconnection between sport and populist politics in Hungary, 
with a particular emphasis on the appropriation of sport by ‘right-wing’ populist 
political actors. In particular, this paper will examine the politics – sport 
interconnection by discussing Victor Orbán’s, Hungary’s Prime Minister, use of 
football, and sport more broadly, and the ways in which the Hungarian government 
have attempted to reinvent a strong nation and national identity through sport and 
related political populism. These attempts have been influenced by the interaction 
between forces of Westernisation and the country’s continuing post-communist 
transition, with the view to (re)inventing the Hungarian nation. 
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Introduction 
 
In light of the contemporary growth of ‘populist’ political parties and movements in a 
number of highly-developed democratic states in Europe and North America, there 
has been a resurgence in academic interest around the various causes for the 
groundswell of support for political populism (Brubaker 2019; Judis 2016; Moffitt & 
Tormey 2014; Mudde & Kaltwasser 2012). A number of contemporary political 
developments in various international contexts have, thus, triggered a renewed 
emphasis on the importance of populist ideological positions. Such developments 
could include the election of President Donald Trump in the United States of America 
(Eiermann 2016; Kazin 2016; Kellner 2016), the success of the ‘Leave’ campaign in 
the British referendum on European Union membership (Clarke & Newman 2017; 
Freeden 2017; Gusterson 2017; Inglehart & Norris 2016) and the unexpected 
popularity of the Brexit Party in the 2019 UK European Elections, and the emergence 
of secessionist nationalism movements in ‘stateless’ nations such as Scotland and 
Catalonia (Carbonell 2018; Duerr 2015; Guibernau 2014; Keating 1996). The 
mounting of populist politics within the European context is evidenced by the growth 
of ‘left-wing’ and ‘right-wing’ populist parties that has increased in Spain, Greece, 
Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Hungary, amongst others (Mols & 
Jetten 2016; Wodak 2015; Wodak, KhosraviNik & Mral 2013; Yilmaz 2012).  
 
Whilst there are similarities as regards the reasons why populist political parties have 
come to the fore across Europe, there are also nation-based idiosyncrasies which 
need to be considered. For instance, Central and Eastern European countries have 
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experienced dissimilar political, economic and cultural development trajectories in 
comparison to Wester European ones. Nevertheless, in all of these regions of 
Europe, the growing presence of populist political parties is observable 
(https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36130006). Given this broader political 
context, in this paper we explore populist politics in Hungary, specifically the 
interconnection between sport and state, with a particular emphasis on the ‘use’ of 
sport by ‘right-wing’ populist political parties and key actors. Specifically, we will 
elaborate on Victor Orbán’s, Hungary’s Prime Minister, political manoeuvres with 
football, and sport, by analysing the ways in which the Hungarian government have 
attempted to reinvent a strong nation and national identity through sport and related 
political populism. Here we will argue that these attempts have been influenced by 
the interaction between forces of Westernisation and the country’s continuing post-
communist transition. Our analysis is informed by existing research and mass media 
based evidence around key political and economic transitions which influence and 
have influenced the interconnection between sport, political populism and national 
identity in the Hungarian context.  
Whilst not executing a systematic review, we have conducted an extensive literature 
search similar to the procedures outlined in Dehghansai et al. (2017) to identify 
relevant academic sources by searching through the databases such as 
SportDiscus, PubMed and Google Scholar. After having received ethical approval, 
we used the following search terms to identify key sources: ‘popular politics’, 
'populism’, ‘popular politics and sport’, ‘popular politics and Hungary’, ‘populism and 
Hungary’, and ‘Hungary and national identity and sport’. Based on the searches a 
large number of sources were identified, especially in the area of popular politics and 
populism. Consequently, we decided to only include sources that were written in 
English or in Hungarian, peer reviewed, and deemed key in relation to popular 
politics, Hungarian politics, and Hungarian sport and national identity. These sources 
construct the foundation of our analysis of popular politics, Hungary and sport.  
In addition to academic articles, we have also used a range of publicly accessible 
online mass media sources. To locate relevant web pages, we used Google in 
English and origo.hu in Hungarian with the following key words: ‘Hungarian sport and 
national identity’, ‘Hungarian sport and popular politics’, ‘Hungarian sport and regime 
change’, and ‘Orbán and sport’. As the results of our searches were again extensive, 
we operationalised the results through use of a specific cut-off point, which was after 
the first thirty links listed by the respective search engines. Out of the sources that 
met the first criterion, we only included those which were: a) directly relevant to the 
focus of the study; b) publicly accessible; and, c) from well-established, credible 
organisations (e.g. official web sites, government webpages, credible investigative 
reporting sites). The remaining sources we then put to a qualitative content analysis 
(see Bryman, 2015), specifically focusing on connections between politics, sport, 
football, Hungary and national identity. This content analysis, thus, provided the 
corpus of data and literature sources upon which we have based our discussion 
presented in the subsequent sections.  
The era of ‘populist’ politics? 
 
The growth of ‘populism’ within politics has rapidly become a central consideration 
for contemporary political analysts, with significant attention devoted to it in political 
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sciences and broader public political debates. Whilst there is broad agreement 
around ‘populism’s recent significant upsurge, a number of debates have emerged 
regarding its specific nature and the causal factors leading to its growth (Bonikowski 
et al. 2018). Bonikowski et al. (2018: 1) argued that populism can take: 
 
…many forms, spanning continents and cutting across left–right lines. It 
is often used to describe both parties of the right… that oppose 
immigration and seek to restore national sovereignty; and of the left… 
that pit the people against an exploitative economic elite. 
 
Whilst Bonikowski et al. (2018) successfully expressed certain shared 
understandings of populism, there remains a disjuncture in their theorisations around 
both its causes and nature, indicating the need to consider country-specific socio-
political idiosyncrasies reflective of the ‘impure’ nature of populism (Brubaker 2019).  
 
In terms of the growth of populism, a number of arguments have emerged. There is 
agreement that the recent successes of populism is a by-product of the 2007-08 
global financial crisis and a reaction to the subsequent socio-economic challenges 
triggered by global neoliberal economic policies and deregulations (Salmela & von 
Schave 2017; Gusterson 2017; Inglehart & Norris 2016). However, public reaction to 
the failures of this neoliberal system did not shift the electorate towards the 
established ideological ‘left’. Instead, populist parties exploited public resentment of 
rising multiculturalism to blame the immigrant ‘other’ following the 2007-2008 
financial crisis, rather than neoliberal economic policies which had preceded it 
(Bonikowski et al. 2018; Salmela & von Schave 2017; Gusterson 2017; Fernández-
García & Luengo, 2018; Milačić & Vuković 2018; Roodujin 2015). In this regard, 
Salmela & von Schave (2017: 587) suggest that: 
 
…individual-level emotional responses mediate between macro-level 
sociocultural and economic changes, such as globalization, modernization 
and economic deregulation, and the micro-level motivation to support 
right-wing populist parties… experienced in post-industrial societies can 
transmute through repressed shame into anger, resentment and hatred 
towards perceived ‘enemies’ of the self … 
 
Given growing public resentment to the immigrant ‘other’, many Western 
democracies have witnessed increased support for right-wing populism which is 
firmly aligned with ‘ethnic nationalism’ (Kohn 1944). Such right-wing 
conceptualisations of nationalism place emphasis on collective nationalist sentiments 
based on shared ethnic and cultural foundations. This resonates with ‘primordialist’ 
theorisations of the nation, stressing the cohesive importance of long-term historical 
roots linked to socio-biological factors such as ethnicity, bloodline and ‘cultural 
givens’ such as language, customs and 'home' territory (Geertz 1973; Lefebvre 
1991, Van den Berghe 1995). Similar arguments regarding the primacy afforded to 
these ‘ethnies’ are offered by an ‘ethnosymbolist’ approach to nationalism (Smith, 
1986, 2010). Here, the potential impact of the symbolic elements of nationalist 
cohesion are underpinned by the social, cultural, political and emotional attachment 
which emanates from identification with a particular ‘ethnie’ (Smith, 1986, 2010), 
thus, going beyond Kohn’s dichotomy. 
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Another agreement regarding the nature of contemporary populist politics is the 
vilification of the elites (Bonikowski 2017; Bonikowski et al. 2018; Fernández-García 
& Luengo 2018; Moffitt & Tormey 2014; Roodujin 2015). Bonikowski (2017: 184) 
argues the ‘specific elites targeted by populists vary depending on the populists’ 
ideological predilections’, which, therefore, explains the multifarious forms of populist 
movements which have emerged across the ‘left-right’ ideological spectrum. 
However, specific to right-wing political populism, the ‘elites’ who are held to account 
for societal and economic problems tend to be those who have espoused pro-
immigration, pro-globalisation and socially progressive policies, framing these 
policies as a pursuit of political self-interest at the expense of the general public. This 
vilification of moral elites acts as one element of the ‘political style’ of contemporary 
populism (Moffitt & Tormey, 2014). Moffitt & Tormey (2014: 387) argue that a focus 
on the performative elements of populist politics ‘contextualises populism’s position 
in the contemporary ‘stylised’ political landscape and brings representation to the 
forefront of discussions about populism’, highlighting the self-presentation of populist 
politicians as an antidote to the over-stylised, established political actors. 
 
In sum, whilst ‘populism’ remains controversial within contemporary politics, a 
degree of agreement has emerged around it. Rooduijn (2015: 5-6) identifies four 
reasons for the electoral popularity of such parties in Western Europe: 1) nativist 
outlook; 2) tendency to be authoritarian; 3) less satisfied with politics; 4) 
Euroscepticism. However, before turning to whether these four reasons are equally 
applicable to the rise of PRR in Hungary, we outline some of the ways in which the 
interconnection between sport and populist politics have manifested themselves in 
numerous nations. 
 
Populism, nationalism, right-wing politics and sport 
 
Hoberman (1984) argued in his seminal text on the interconnection between sport 
and political ideology that sport was frequently used by political leaders and heads of 
states across the ideological spectrum to harness and buttress support for their 
particular vision of their ‘nation’. With specific reference to the Cold War era, in which 
Hoberman was writing, he noted that his work: 
 
…interprets the political cultures of sport as proxy warriors in a larger 
ideological conflict which has pitted Marxist dogma, in its variety, against 
its two historical adversaries: first, fascism, and then the postwar non-
Communist bloc, which runs the gamut from quasi-fascist (anti-Marxist) 
dictatorships to the (anti-Marxist) liberal democracies (Hoberman 1984: 6) 
 
Whilst this conceptualisation of sportspeople as ‘proxy warriors’ clearly resonates 
with the ideological clash between ‘East’ and ‘West’ in sporting ‘mega-events’ such 
as the Olympic Games in the Cold War era (Grix 2013; Roche 2002; Peppard & 
Riordan 1993), it has also possessed explanatory value for analysing the nature of 
the interconnection between sport, politics and the ‘nation’ in various post-Cold-War 
geographic contexts (Bowes & Bairner 2018; Cashmore 2005; Jedlicka 2018; Merkel 
2009). The ability of sport to evoke nationalist sentiments and support amongst a 
nation’s population has, therefore, unsurprisingly not gone unnoticed by political 
leaders, autocratic or democratic alike.  
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Turning attention more towards the interconnection between ‘right-wing’ political 
populism and sporting matters, it can be argued that a number of common patterns 
have emerged with regard to the exploitation of sport by politicians on the right. 
Given that these political actors tend to espouse the nativist, nationalist and 
authoritarian principles identified in Roodujin’s (2015) account, sporting competitions 
on the international stage provide an opportunity for nationalist political actors to 
express support (or otherwise) for their nation’s sporting representatives, especially 
given the symbolic image they portray to the rest of the world (Allison,2000; Bairner 
2001, 2015). Unsurprisingly, the political exploitation of a nation’s sporting success 
on the global stage by right-wing politics is the most frequent manifestation of the 
sport-politics interconnection, with the victories of the nation’s athletes or teams 
framed as evidence of the superiority of that nation’s people or political ideology 
(Hoberman 1986).  
 
Oft-cited examples of the exploitation of sport by right-wing, fascist regimes include 
Hitler’s use of the 1936 Berlin Olympics (Houlihan 1994; Mandell 1971) and the 
exploitation of football by Mussolini’s fascist regime in Italy (Kassimeris 2011a; 
Scalia 2009). Similar tactics have also been adopted by more recent authoritarian 
and/or right-wing nationalist political leaders, ranging from those who champion 
sporting successes to foster nationalist sentiments such as the example of Tudjman 
in post-Yugoslav era Croatia (Brentin 2013, 2016; Sack & Suster 2000; Vrcan 2002) 
through to the public denouncement of sporting failures which are blamed on the 
impact of ‘migrant players’ by right-wing politicians, as has been seen in the French 
context in the actions of Jean-Marie Le Pen’s National Front (Marks 1998; 
Kassimeris 2011b). 
 
Switching attention from the international to the domestic level of political operation, 
sport’s mass appeal within a given nation also presents an opportunity for politicians 
to bolster their electoral support. In the European context, the primary vehicle for 
domestic political appropriation is football, with the pre-existence of strong fan 
cultures and identities for football clubs offering scope for political actors to align their 
political beliefs with those influential fan groups (Hadas 2000; Kassimeris 2011a; 
Scalia 2009; Thangaraj et al. 2018). For example, Scalia’s (2009) analysis of the 
interconnection between football and politics in Italy contends that football clubs 
have been used by contemporary Italian politicians as a ‘branch of their patronage 
machine’ (p. 48), which for some clubs has led to an alignment with extreme right-
wing political causes. More recently, the English context has also witnessed the rise 
of right-wing political movements such as the Democratic Football Lads Alliance 
which have spawned from football fan cultures (Thangaraj et al. 2018). 
 
Therefore, whilst such interaction between sport and right-wing politics is present in 
a range of countries across Europe, we argue that the connection between those 
social institutions is both traditional and extensive, and recently rejuvenated in 
Hungary. Given this, we turn our attention to this country’s recent history, i.e., post-
communist transition, to foreground Victor Orbán’s appropriation of sport.  
 
Hungary’s post-communist political transition 
 
Hungary, a country geographically located in the centre of Europe, has had a 
turbulent past (Lendvai, 2003), which still has bearing on its current socio-cultural, 
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economic and political development. Arguably one of the most significant recent 
changes has been the country getting rid of the Soviet yoke and returning to the fold 
of Western democracy. Soviet influence over Hungary began to decrease in the late 
1980s, a precursor to the collapse of the ‘Iron Curtain’ in 1989. Åslund (1999) noted 
that the failing Soviet system left its annexed countries in multiple uncertainties 
which had to be remedied. However, the downfall of the Soviet Union also provided 
opportunities for global (re)integration (Földes & Inotai 2001; Mátyás 2002; Molnar 
2006), which, in turn, helped new frameworks and reforms emerge (Molnar et al. 
2011). As a result, Hungary experienced extensive society-wide changes, including 
the return of democratic elections and a multi-party political system. 
 
The first post-communist democratic elections took place on 25th March 1990 with 
the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) securing dominance and forming a coalition 
government with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) and the 
Independent Smallholder’s Party (FGKP). Whilst liberal voices, such as the Alliance 
of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), were supported by some of the votes the majority of 
the people favoured conservative, nationalist parties. As financial instability 
continued in all areas of Hungary in the 1990s (Meusburger 2001), people began to 
lose faith in the new system and government, leading to the return of the reformed 
communist party (Hungarian Socialist Party – MSZP), which won the second 
elections on 8th May 1994 and formed a coalition government with the Alliance of 
Free Democrats (SZDSZ). These elections were a bitter disappointment for FIDESZ, 
which created an intra-party struggle, triggering a significant political shift away from 
liberal ideas towards conservative and nationalist sentiments. Whilst the Hungarian 
Socialist Party retained most of its popularity during its mandate, the 1998 elections 
saw the rise of the reformed, now more conservative, FIDESZ, which won the most 
seats in the Hungarian parliament and formed a coalition government with MDF and 
FGKP.  
 
Despite three different governments between 1990 and 2002, economic instability 
remained significant in Hungary. According to a survey carried out in 2000 (cited in 
Molnar 2011), 82% of the respondents had had higher living standards during the 
communist era than in the new democracy. Economic instability began to create a 
politically-divided Hungary with MSZP and FIDESZ being the two dominant parties. 
This division was reflected in the outcome of the 2002 elections, in which FIDESZ 
could retain its majority in the House of Parliament, but MSZP managed to form 
government by establishing a coalition with SZDSZ. The MSZP-SZDSZ coalition 
government proven strong and retained its majority in the 2006 general elections 
when they became the first government to be re-elected in Hungary since the 
collapse of communism. However, the MSZP leader’s, Ference Gyurcsány, 
confidential, post-election party congress speech was leaked to the public, triggering 
pronounced nation-wide controversy and protests. The infamous speech is referred 
to as the ‘Őszöd Speech’ and at that time grabbed both the domestic and 
international mass media’s attention given the brutally direct political remarks made 
by Gyurcsány (www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5359546.stm). 
 
The Őszöd Speech was the beginning of the decline of the MSZP and, more 
importantly, the rise of FIDESZ. In addition to the scandal surrounding Prime Minster 
Gyurcsány, Hungary did not fare well economically in the second half of 2000s as 
that period experienced the economic crisis commencing in 2008 (Molnar and Doczi, 
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forthcoming). A combination of political outrage and economic instability led to the 
landslide 2010 general election victory for FIDESZ, which the party referred to as a 
‘revolution at the polls’ (Palonen 2012: 931). This victory mandated for large-scale 
transformations in Hungary due to the two-thirds majority possessed by the 
governing coalition parties, sufficiently large for constitutional changes. The new 
constitution changed the official name of the country from the Hungarian Republic to 
Hungary, revealing an inclination to create a borderless nation of Hungarians, aiming 
for the inclusion of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring countries (Palonen 
2012). The FIDESZ government has maintained its efforts to strengthen the Magyar1 
nation inside and outside of Hungary’s borders. Sport, especially football, became a 
dominant tool for Victor Orbán to flex his nationalist muscles and retain his popularity 
over three consecutive general elections.  
 
Sport in post-communist Hungarian politics: FIDESZ’s growing influence 
 
The relationship between politics and sport in the early years of the post-communist 
era was random and sporadic. It has been argued that sport probably lost most of its 
political significance as the general public became aware of its political appropriation 
by the communist regime which made politicians of the 1990s cautious (Molnar 
2007). A trend regarding politicians publicly expressing a disinterest in sport was 
also observed to demarcate themselves from communist political agendas (Molnar 
2007). Interestingly, FIDESZ departed from this attitude and during its first coalition 
government (1998-2002) showed active involvement in sport, specifically football 
development. In many ways, FIDESZ’s strategic use of sport for political ends 
therefore simply mirrored the wider trend within this period in other developed and 
developing nations in Europe outlined above (Brentin 2013, 2016; Kassimeris 2011a, 
2011b; Marks 1998; Sack & Suster 2000; Vrcan 2002). For instance, a professional 
football league was launched in the 1999-2000 season, a state-funded football 
grassroots development was created, a football Stadia Reconstruction Programme 
initiated (Molnar et al. 2011), and the Minister of Youth and Sport at that time, Tamás 
Deutsch, actively interfered with the internal affairs of the Hungarian Football 
Association (Hoffer & Thaly 2000). To what extent FIDESZ’s strong connection to 
sport helped or impaired the party’s political position and progress in the 1990s and 
early 2000s is moot; nonetheless, their first administration is a clear indication of 
their political approach to deploying sport for their purposes and also is a harbinger 
of the post-2010 interconnections between sport and politics in Hungary.  
 
FIDESZ regained political power in 2010 and has held onto it ever since. During this 
period several radical reforms across the country were introduced, showing intent to 
centralise and control strategic areas, such as energy industry, education and media. 
The new regime, named the System of National Cooperation, developed a scheme 
to work together against the challenges posed by globalisation, Westernisation and 
the ongoing economic crisis (Molnar & Dóczi, forthcoming). The reactionary nature of 
these protectionist strategic reforms can be argued to resonate with broader 
arguments regarding the pre-cursors of populist political ideologies in European 
politics (Salmela & von Schave 2017; Gusterson 2017; Inglehart & Norris 2016). The 
Orbán era of Hungarian politics echoes the sceptical arguments of many other 
                                                 
1 Although Hungarian and Magyar often used interchangeable, here we use the term ‘Magyar’, 
especially ‘Magyars’ to refer to Hungarians inside and outside of the geographic are of Hungary.  
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parties on the ‘right’ of European politics regarding the threat to Hungarian 
sovereignty and economic development from the liberal policies of the European 
Union in relation to trade and immigration. It, therefore, appears that within that 
broader ideological approach, sport was identified as a key strategic sector to 
reinforce a distinctive sense of Hungarian identity as FIDESZ resumed its previous 
attempts to centralise and incorporate it into their politics. This meant that sport, 
football specifically, became a distinctive aspect of right-wing popular politics in 
Hungary and, in turn, the recipient of significant central investment (Ligeti & Mucsi 
2016).  
 
Arguably, there are two chief reasons as to why football has regained its political 
significance in the FIDESZ era: the personal and the political. On a personal level, 
the leader of FIDESZ and Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, is and has been 
a passionate football fan and player. He even continued to play semi-professional 
football in Felcsút for a fourth-division team during his first reign as Prime Minister. 
As was the case for Italy’s ex-Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi through his past 
ownership of one of Italy’s leading football clubs, A.C. Milan (Kassimeris 2011a; 
Scalia 2009), Orbán’s pre-existing association with football can, therefore, be argued 
to have offered him a unique opportunity to present himself to the Hungarian 
electorate as a politician with the ‘common touch’. This positioning of football as an 
important element of Hungarian popular culture is a valuable attribute for the 
effective populist political actor who wishes to distance their public persona from the 
political, intellectual and institutional elites, against which populist political parties 
often rail (Bonikowski 2017; Bonikowski et al. 2018; Fernández-García & Luengo 
2018; Moffitt &Tormey 2014; Roodujin 2015). Orbán’s frequent Eurosceptic, anti-
immigration and anti-multiculturalism rhetoric is evidence of right wing populist 
political tendencies (Harris, 2017).  
 
Orbán’s personal connection to Felcsút saw the small town receiving an economic 
boost in the form of a football stadium, the Pancho Arena. This development is part 
of Orbán’s aspiration to improve the quality of Hungarian football and restore the 
golden days of the Magic Magyars (Goldblatt & Nolan 2018). This 3812-capactiy, 
luxury-grade stadium cost around €12.2m and is located near a town with a 
population of approximately 1.800 – an unorthodox location for a football arena of 
this scale at twice the capacity of its host town. Given this, Ligeti & Mucsi (2016) 
argue that football stadia construction is one of the main ways in which public money 
unaccountably disappears in Orbán-era Hungary. The Felcsút football club is the 
point in case as it received €30 million central funding between 2011 and 2014 out of 
a €240 million budget that was to be shared across more than 1100 clubs (Ligeti & 
Mucsi 2016). In addition to centrally-funded football development, Orbán also 
regularly comments on the sport and related results in state-sponsored mass media 
and perceives Hungarians to be a football-smart nation. Another example of football-
politics connection is the celebratory government voices which were present when, 
after a 30-year gap in international football achievements, the Hungarian national 
team qualified for the 2016 European Championship (Molnar & Dóczi forthcoming). 
Such explicit attempts to associate the successes of Hungary’s footballing 
representatives with the nation’s political leadership, thus, continues a long-
established pattern from political leaders who wish to gain political capital from sport 
(Hoberman 1984; Allison 2000; Bairner 2001, 2015; Houlihan 1994, Hadas 2000). 
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As a consequence of being identified as a key strategic political sector, sport, and 
football specifically, was granted unprecedented state support. Ligeti & Mucsi (2016: 
117) list the number and volume of football stadia investments by the Hungarian 
government since 2010. The FIDESZ government have spent over €100 million on 
such investments. The need for this level of investment is particularly questionable 
as, despite new stadia, the Nemzeti Sport [National Sport] (2014) newspaper 
reported that match attendance numbers were dwindling. Other sport facilities have 
also been (re)constructed, which coincides with the government’s aim to stage 
sporting mega-events and major international events, such as World Aquatics 
Championships, Football European Championships, World Championships in 
Athletics, and Summer Olympic Games (Molnar & Dóczi forthcoming). Moreover, in 
2015 a state funded television channel was launched dedicated to broadcasting 
sports, specifically covering events where Hungarian athletes participate. These are 
all examples of continuously increasing state influence of and interference with sport, 
especially football (See Goldblatt & Nolan 2018). Based on the above examples, it is 
safe to say that the current government, and Orbán leading it, have been 
redistributing public funds as they see fit, with sport acting as a medium for achieving 
specific political goals with limited public outcry given the popular (and populist) 
nature of sport in Hungarian culture.  
 
‘Defender of the Homeland’: Reinventing the Magyars through Football in 
Orbán’s Hungary 
 
Perhaps due to the above described events and political actions, Harris (2017) 
observes that in Central Europe Hungary has the lowest democratic score and 
remarks it appropriate that Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European 
Commission, greeted the Hungarian prime minister in Riga in May 2015 by saying 
‘Hello, dictator’. Whilst it may initially appear harsh to call Orbán a dictator, US 
Senator, John McCain, had referred to him as such a year earlier 
(https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-usa-idUSKCN0JH1EW20141203), and 
on closer inspection some of the actions of his administration may qualify for that 
title. Broadly speaking, Orbán views immigration and liberal/multicultural EU policies 
as threats to the Hungarian nation, and has, therefore, implemented a range of 
actions to ‘protect’ the Magyars, including changing the Hungarian constitution 
multiple times, catering for the needs of the Hungarian oligarchs, declaring his aims 
to build an ‘illiberal state’, and, perhaps most importantly, portraying himself as the 
‘defender’ of Hungary.  
 
Interestingly and importantly, the self-proclaimed ‘defender of the Homeland’ rhetoric 
expressed by Orbán and his political entourage does not exclusively refer to the 
Hungarian nation within its existing borders, but to the greater, pre-Trianon (1920) 
Kingdom of Hungary. The Hungarian Spectrum (2018) notes that post-communist 
governments ‘pledged Hungary’s acceptance of the present borders, but Viktor 
Orbán is retreating from that position.’ In other words, Orbán envisions the 
Hungarian nation in its pre-Trianon form with all the lost territories (re)attached. He 
adopts an irredentist stance on the matter to re-connect Magyars inside and outside 
of Hungary and football, in particular, has become an institute through which all 
Magyars may be (re)united.  
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Here it is worth noting that irredentism and post-Trianon Hungary go hand-in-hand. 
The end of the Great War and the outcome of the consequent peace negotiations 
dissolved the Austro-Hungarian Empire and greatly reduced both the population and 
geographic size of Hungary. Beiner (2013: 41) observes that the late arriving 
Hungarian delegation was served a document ‘fait accompli’. In particular Part II of 
the document (Frontiers of Hungary) ‘stipulated that the Kingdom of Hungary was to 
lose approximately 70% of its former territory and, according to their reckoning, 
almost a third of its ethnic Hungarian population (3.3 million out of 10.7 million) to six 
neighbouring countries’. This historic decimation of Hungary both as a country and a 
nation left deep scars in the Hungarian psyche (Várdy 1997). This feeling of national 
resentment was somewhat oppressed during the communist era as it was 
considered ‘as the product of imperialism, serving bourgeois and landowner 
interests’ (Beiner, 2013: 42). However, in the new democracy such nationalistic 
sentiments resurfaced with gusto and Orbán harnessed them to serve his political 
ends.  
 
The reunification efforts through sport is a sign Orbán’s recognition of sport’s socio-
cultural significance in Hungary and in the construction of Hungarian national 
identity. For instance, through a survey-based study, Örkény (2005) demonstrated 
that in both 1995 and 2003 sport achievements were one of the highest sources of 
national pride in Hungary, significantly exceeding other categories such as the 
economy, social security, and democracy. Pertinent to our arguments on sport here, 
Örkény (2005: 40) also noted that ‘those who run for a nationalist movement and 
popular sport should appeal, first of all, to people’s ethnocentric dispositions’. This 
connection between Hungarian national identity and pride is astutely recognised by 
the Orbán regime. However, for Orbán, national identity often shifts to regional 
identity as a way of demarcating himself, the Hungarian nation, and the wider region 
from the ‘oppressive’ European Union. Csehi (2019: 1016), based on an analysis of 
Orbán’s speeches, observes that for Orbán ‘the corrupt elite’ was more and more 
equated with ‘European bureaucrats’. Consequently, the Prime Minister has been 
fostering a regional identity which shifted from calling on the people of Hungary, to 
Hungarians (Magyars), and then to ‘Central Europeans’. Csehi (2019: 1017) argues 
that the ‘constant reinterpretation of “the people” with newer and newer layers of 
identity was carried out to ensure stable, or even increased mobilization behind his 
political agenda’. 
 
In relation to football, Orbán’s reunification efforts have manifested through 
substantial state support for football academies inside and outside of the country’s 
borders where Hungarian minorities reside, including Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, 
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia.2 This shows a clear intention to symbolically unite 
Hungarians across national borders through football. The Hungarian Spectrum 
(2018) referred to these efforts of the government as creating ‘extraterritorial football 
facilities as the glue of national cohesion.’ Oroszi and Sipos (2018) unfolded the 
                                                 
2See details at: 
https://index.hu/sport/futball/2018/01/09/20_milliard_felett_hataron_tuli_labdarugas_magyar_allami_ta
mogatas/ http://www.nemzetisport.hu/egyeb_egyeni/sportpolitika-ime-a-kormany-ev-vegi-sportcelu-
tamogatasai-2676037 
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Orbán government’s investments into the construction of footballing facilities 
outsides of the Hungary’s borders and have identified that between 2013 and 2018 
there was an approximately HUF16 billion (€50 million) expenditure. These efforts 
are in-line with the aforementioned recent constitutional change to the official name 
of the country from Hungarian Republic to Hungary. Football’s role in these nation 
(re)building endeavours has been to become a platform through which all Magyars 
living in and outside of Hungary may unite.  
 
To this end, whilst the Orbán government’s extra-territorial sporting investments may 
be easily interpreted as nothing more than regional diplomacy or a form of ‘banal 
nationalism’ (Billig 1995), we contend that those activities are greater importance in 
relation to the reconstruction of a conceptualisation of a Hungarian nation which 
invokes ethnically-rooted, ‘hot’ forms of nationalism (Hutchinson, 2006). In other 
words, it can be argued that the re-emergence of irredentist attitudes in post-
communist Hungary have been harnessed by the Orbán administration to create a 
form of sports policy with the view to reinvent a post-communist, Western Hungary. 
This strategic approach, thus, can be argued to resemble a form of Hungarian 
cultural imperialism in the Carpathian Basin, aiming to portray Hungary as a ‘football-
smart nation’ with a reach beyond its geographic borders to unite all ethnic 
Hungarians, thereby (re)vitalising a national identity that has been continuously 
oppressed, bruised, and challenged in the twentieth century and beyond (Várdy & 
Várdy, 1989; Várdy, 1997; Molnar & Dóczi, forthcoming). The words of Orbán 
himself at the grand opening of the MOL Football Academy in Dunajská Streda, 
Slovakia in 2018 explicate our contentions regarding the symbolic significance of 
these strategic foreign investments in sporting infrastructure as an ethnically-derived 
form of ‘hot nationalism’ uniting ethnic Hungarians across existing state borders: 
 
I would like to make it clear – without pathos or pomp – that, now and in 
the future, the people of Dunaszerdahely and the Hungarians of Felvidék 
[the Hungarian-populated region of Slovakia] can rely on Hungary, on the 
Hungarian government, and on me personally… we should be happy that 
Hungarians beyond the borders and Hungarians at home have found one 
another, and are capable of building and creating things together not only 
at home, but also beyond the borders… Sport is an excellent link between 
the peoples and countries of the Carpathian Basin – and therefore also 
between Hungary and Slovakia (https://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-
minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-
speech-at-the-inauguration-of-the-mol-football-academy). 
 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 
In this article we have focused on the gradual emergence of popular politics across 
Europe, and have provided a brief summary of some of the relevant and 
bourgeoning literature to foreground our discussion of the specific manifestation of 
populist politics in the domain of Hungarian sport and society. We argued that while 
a degree of dissonance remains in contemporary politically-inclined research as 
regards to how to specifically define and interpret popular politics, some common 
trends are observable. However, we deem it essential to explore popular politics and 
populist political parties in action within their own socio-cultural settings.  
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To unpack some of the existing tendencies of right-wing populist political parties, we 
focused on Hungary and the current Hungarian government’s ever increasing 
presence in sport, specifically football. We have contended that the FIDESZ-lead 
administration deviated from previous post-communist practices in terms of their 
relation to sport and football development. In fact, we argue that since 2010, the 
beginning of the FIDESZ era, significant changes have taken place across Hungary 
and Hungarian sport. Sport has become part of the government’s strategic plan, in 
which football in particular has gained a significant role. We explained that football’s 
centrality has derived from two reasons: personal and political. Personal reasons 
included the long-term, active football involvement of Victor Orbán who has invested 
millions of Euros into football stadia development (most of which are highly 
controversial), endeavouring to bring back the golden days of the ‘Magical Magyars’ 
in order to successfully re-frame Hungary as a ‘football smart nation’.  
 
The political reasons, not disconnected from the personal, centre more around 
issues regarding the Hungarian nation and national identity. Given that Hungary’s 
turbulent history and the consequences of World War I peace negotiations have 
remained in the Magyar national psyche, but were supressed during the communist 
period, the post-Iron Curtain democratic era has given rise to irredentist sentiments 
across the nation. We argued that the Orbán government has harnessed them for 
their own political ends. In this arrangement, Orbán has been portrayed as the 
‘Defender of the Homeland’ whereby he is there to protect Hungary as a country and 
to unite all Magyars in and outside of the country. In this irredentist endeavour, 
football and related investments have become a key political tool for the government, 
which has made a number of significant foreign investments in building stadia and 
other football facilities in areas that used to belong to the pre-Trianon Kingdom of 
Hungary.  
 
In this light, we argue that these activities of the government can be seen as a form 
of reconstruction of a conceptualisation of a Hungarian nation which invokes 
ethnically-rooted, ‘hot’ forms of nationalism and primordial perception of nationhood. 
This approach aims to remedy and (re)vitalise a Magyar national identity as a 
strategic response to the multitude of contemporary challenges that span from 
economic uncertainties, European Union-based centralism and mass migration 
triggered national fears. However, as similar right-wing populist movements continue 
to gain momentum across other European nations in response to these 
contemporary global challenges, what remains to be seen is the extent to which 
these endeavours by Orbán’s government do indeed bear fruit in terms of Hungary’s 
economic, social and political development within the tumultuous political climate 
which is impacting upon the supra-national project of the European Union. 
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